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LITIGATION AS A TOOL
IN FOOD ADVERTISING:
A CONSUMER ADVOCACY VIEWPOINT
Stephen Gardner*
I. INTRODUCTION
This Article' is a counterpoint to the piece by two defense
lawyers that also appears in this Symposium issue.
1
First, however, it is essential to know the consumer needs and
the knowledge that companies depend on to market food products
deceptively. In addition, it is important to know why organizations
like the Center for Science in the Public Interest (CSPI), for which
the author is Director of Litigation, and private lawyers as well, have
started considering private lawsuits based on deceptive and unfair
food marketing practices, including those aimed at children.
II. CONSUMER CONFUSION-LOST IN THE SUPERMARKET
Before discussing the current state of food-advertising regu-
lation, it is first appropriate to start with the person who is the target
of concern of consumer advocates and consumer products companies
alike-the consumer herself.
After all, consumer advocates advocate for consumers;
consumer-products companies produce for the consumers; Con-
gress congregates for consumers. This continues through the whole
feeding chain of interests that have been involved in these issues
Stephen Gardner is Director of the Center for Science in the Public
Interest's Litigation Project. He also serves Of Counsel to the National
Consumer Law Center. He graduated from the University of Texas at Austin
(B.A. 1972; J.D. 1975) and is licensed to practice in the States of Texas and
New York, in the United States Supreme Court and numerous other federal
courts. CSPI Legal Assistant Simone Salloum provided valuable research
assistance. This Article is copyrighted 2005 by Stephen Gardner.
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over the past decades.
Consumers repeatedly express preferences for healthful foods
and their concerns with nutrition remain high.2
One problem with predicting actual consumer behavior based on
polls of their expressed needs and desires is that sometimes
consumers give in to the natural tendency (familiar to priests,
psychiatrists, and police) to admit to somewhat higher aspirations
than they in fact have.3 For example, consumers may indicate a
preference for a low-sodium, non-fat hamburger in response to a
mall-intercept pollster with a clipboard. But when subjected to a
continuous onslaught of ads, commercials, and other marketing tools
that urge the consumer to "have it your way," sometimes the spirit
may be willing, but the flesh is weak. And there is too much flesh as
a result. This problem is compounded many times over with
children. One study conducted by the American Psychological
Association demonstrated a link between children's advertising and
obesity, 4 in common with findings of the American Association of
Pediatrics and the World Health Organization. In late 2005, the
National Academies' Institute of Medicine (IOM) detailed how food
and beverage marketing adversely affects young Americans' diets
and health. The IOM, which undertook the most comprehensive
review to date of the influence of food marketing on children, found
that the "prevailing pattern of food and beverage marketing to
children in America represents ... a direct threat to the health of the
next generation." 5 The IOM report also found that television food
1
2. See Consumer's Health and Nutrition Concerns Don't Always
Translate into Action, Res. Alert (EPM Commc'n, New York, NY), Feb. 6,
2004, at 1.
3. See ROBERT B. SETTLE & PAMELA L. ALRECK, WHY THEY BUY:
AMERICAN CONSUMERS INSIDE AND OUT 34-35 (1989).
4. DALE KUNKEL ET AL., REPORT OF THE APA TASK FORCE ON ADVER-
TISING AND CHILDREN: PSYCHOLOGICAL ISSUES IN THE INCREASING COMMER-
CIALIZATION OF CHILDHOOD 12 (2004), available at http://www.apa.org/
monitor/jun04/protecting.html (follow "Read the task force's report" hyper-
link). Alan S. Levy et al., Food & Drug Admin., Knowledge Levels about
Dietary Fats and Cholesterol: 1983-1988, 25 J. NUTRITION EDUC. 60, 60
(1993) ("Recent surveys show that many consumers are confused about fats
and cholesterol, even though they express high levels of concern about these
food components.")i
5. INST. OF MED., FOOD MARKETING TO CHILDREN: THREAT OR
OPPORTUNITY? xiv (J. Michael McGinnis et al. eds., The National Academies
Press 2006).
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and beverage advertising influences consumption and is a contributor
to less healthful diets.
6
A second problem with predicting consumer behavior with
respect to diet and health is the considerable gap between expressed
consumer desires and actual consumer knowledge of the relative
minutiae of nutrition.7 Thus, though most consumers report that
health concerns have caused a major change in their diets8 and that
they use food labels in their search for more healthful foods,9 they
are also lacking in some of the most basic information necessary to
make any significant change in their diet. For example, few con-
sumers understand the relationship between HDL and LDL choles-
terol,' 0 the saturated-fat level of coconut oil," or what a complex
carbohydrate is.12
6. Id. at ES6-7.
7. Id. at 60 (stating that recent surveys show that many consumers are
confused about fats and cholesterol, even though they express high levels of
concern about these food components).
8. See, e.g., Paula Kurtzweil, Taking the Fat Out of Food, FDA CON-
SUMER MAG., July-Aug. 1996, http:www.fda.gov/fdac/features/696_fat.html
(discussing studies about consumer's buying habits including one study that
found three-fourths of consumers stopped buying certain foods because of the
levels of fat listed on the nutrition label).
9. See Jean C. Buzby & Richard C. Ready, Do Consumers Trust Food-
Safety Information?, FOOD REV., Jan.-Apr. 1996, at 43, 43, available at
http://www.ers.usda.gov/publications/foodreview/jan1996/frjan96h.pdf.
10. See, e.g., Americans Know a Good Deal, But Not Enough, About the
Risks of and Treatments to Prevent Heart Disease, WALL ST. J. ONLINE, May
13, 2004, http://www.harrisinteractive.com/news/newsletters/wsjhealthnews/
WSJonline HI Health-carepoll2004vol3_issO9.pdf ("The public understands
that cholesterol matters when it comes to preventing heart disease, but their
knowledge is limited. Many are unaware that changing HDL and LDL levels
affect one's risk or that cholesterol lowering treatments that impact HDL and
LDL levels are effective in preventing heart disease.... ").
11. See Coconut Research Center, Coconut, http://www.coconutresearch
center.org (explaining the history of coconut oil and the different views about
its beneficial and damaging health effects).
12. See Center for Food Safety and Applied Nutrition, FDA, FDA Health
and Diet Survey-2004 Supplement (2005), http://www.cfsan.fda.gov/-comm/
cmutri3.html (reporting that seventy-six percent of Americans either do not
know the difference between starches and sugars or think they have some
effect on a person's weight). Even many of the readers of this Article-
certainly many of whom are above the curve on nutritional issues-would
hesitate to volunteer certain knowledge of these same bits of information if any
sizable amount of money rested on it.
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Perhaps for this reason, consumers tend to express what would,
at first glance, appear to be mutually exclusive desires. First, they
want information to be conveyed in simple terms. Second, they want
enough information to make an informed decision.
13
Consumers indicate that their four primary sources of
information regarding diet and health are (1) news stories, (2) health
organizations, (3) physicians and other health professionals, and (4)
food labels. 14 As for the fourth source, food labels are generally
considered viable and trustworthy sources of such information.'
5
To the intense regret of all of us on the consumer side of the
fence and to great joy of food marketers, consumers nonetheless
report that they believe informational statements in food adver-
tisements.' 6 Presumably, if consumers believe a statement in an
advertisement, they will use it in their search for the truth.
In 2003, CSPI issued its report, "Pestering Parents: How Food
Companies Market Obesity to Children."' 7 This report describes the
conduct of food marketers in far greater detail than this Article, but a
summary of the issues is in order.
Food marketing to children will influence their eating deci-
sions.18 In fact, one study found that children know what they should
eat at a very young age, but whether they act on this knowledge
when choosing a snack is partly a function of whether they have been
exposed to commercials for candy. 19 The World Health Organization
found that, "[flood advertising affects food choices and influences
dietary habits. Food and beverage advertisements should not exploit
13. Alan S. Levy et al., More Effective Nutrition Label Formats Are Not
Necessarily Preferred, 92 J. AM. DIETETIC ASS'N 1230, 1234 (1992).
14. See Buzby & Ready, supra note 9, at 46-47.
15. Cf Jeanne Malmgren, Food Porn: As Director of the Center for Science
in the Public Interest, Michael Jacobson Wants to Clean up Your Diet, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES (Fla.), Jan. 26, 1989 at DI (stating that CSPI has
challenged ineffective and outmoded labeling requirements in an effort to
make nutrition labels more useful to people).
16. See Buzby & Ready, supra note 9, at 46-47.
17. CTR. FOR SCI. IN PUB. INTEREST, PESTERING PARENTS: HOW FOOD
COMPANIES MARKET OBESITY TO CHILDREN (2003), available at http://www
.cspinet.org/reports/index.html (last visited Nov. 5, 2005).
18. Id. at Pt. 1, available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/pages-from_
pesteringparentsfinalpt_ .pdf.
19. Gerald J. Gor & Marvin E. Goldberg, Behavioral Evidence of the
Effects of Televised Food Messages on Children, 9 J. CONSUMER RES. 200,
204 (1982).
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children's inexperience or credulity." 20
Food marketers have successfully targeted children through the
use of cartoon characters, such as SpongeBob SquarePants, to create
brand loyalty at a young age and to encourage children to eat high-
sugar, high-fat foods.2' They have tapped into specific networks that
aim programming at children. For example, Nickelodeon aims its
weekday daytime "Nick Jr." block at preschoolers. As Nickelodeon
brags, "the Nick Jr. block was created as a place preschoolers could
call their own while their older siblings were in school. 22 Adver-
tisers have a built-in audience to target because of this special pro-
gramming. All the while children's parents thought they were safely
watching harmless television.
The nature and extent of food marketing aimed directly at
children is a serious and severe problem because young children lack
the cognitive development to understand that these are commercial
efforts aimed at persuading them to buy junk foods.
23
Food marketers use Nickelodeon's SpongeBob SquarePants
character to get kids to eat Burger King products, trans-fat-con-
taining cookies, and ice cream. The United Kingdom, on the other
hand, forbids companies to deliberately target the country's youngest
children.24  For instance, children's television personalities are
prohibited from appearing in any advertisements before 9:00 p.m.
25
In addition, marketers may not advertise merchandise-based char-
acters within two hours preceding or succeeding the character's
program. 26  The BBC itself flatly prohibits the use of its own
program personalities, such as the Teletubbies, in fast food
20. Fifty-seventh World Health Assembly, Global Strategy on Diet,
Physical Activity and Health, at 13, WHA 57/17 (May 22, 2004), available at
http://www.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf files/WHA57/A57_R 17-en.pdf.
21. See Elizabeth Jensen, A TV Channel Takes Aim at Toddlers, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 26, 2005, at C2 ("An additional enticement is the possibility of
revenue from sales of licensed products featuring the TV characters, said
Cyma Zarghami, president of Nickelodeon Television.").
22. Nick.com, Nick History, http://www.nick.com/allnick/everythingnick
/historyhome.jhtml (last visited Oct. 11, 2005).
23. KUNKEL ET AL., supra note 4, at 6-9.
24. CORINNA HAWKES, MARKETING FOOD TO CHILDREN: THE GLOBAL
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advertisements. 27 Many other countries have taken similar steps to
stop food companies from deceiving young children through
advertisements.28
If we could rely on the kindness of food marketers, we would
probably be able to provide consumers with exactly what they say
they want-sufficient information that is simple to understand.
However, we cannot.
Food marketers are not out to inform the public; they are out to
sell a product. One primary way they sell their product to the
exclusion of others is by creating a point of difference. 29 A point of
difference is a product or service's characteristic that differentiates it
from other products or services recognizable by customers. 30 This
point of difference may well be created out of the whole cloth, where
no perceived difference has existed and where no meaningful
difference does exist.3' Perhaps the best expression of advertising
ethics in this regard is by that grand old man of advertising, David
Ogilvy.32 Olgivy bragged that "I could have positioned Dove as a
detergent bar for men with dirty hands, but chose instead to position
it as a toilet bar for women with dry skin. This is still working 25
years later."
33
III. FEDERAL CONSUMER PROTECTION-DEAD AGAIN
With the advent of the Bush Administration's regulatory con-
cept, which is best characterized as "he governs best who governs
27. Press Release, BBC Worldwide, BBC Worldwide Sets New Food
Standards (Apr. 5, 2004), http://www.bbc.co.uk/pressoffice/commercial/world
widestories/pressreleases/2004/04_april/food.shtml.
28. HAWKES, supra note 24, at 19 tbl.4 (noting that Norway, Sweden and
the Canadian province of Quebec ban advertising to children under twelve
years old, and that in Austria, Belgium, Greece and Italy, children's advertising
cannot be shown during children's programming).
29. See THEODORE LEvrrr, THE MARKETING IMAGINATION 85-93 (1986)
(stating that many generically undifferentiated consumer goods are oper-
ationally differentiated by means of branding, packaging, advertising, styled
features and pricing); see also JACK TROUT, DIFFERENTIATE OR DIE:
SURVIVAL IN OUR ERA OF KILLER COMPETTrIoN 65-72 (2000).
30. See TROUT, supra note 29, at 29.
31. See LEVITT, supra note 29, at 86-87.
32. DAVID OGILVY, OGILVY ON ADVERTISING 12 (1983).
33. Id. (emphasis added).
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least"34 (except when a pal needs a little help) has come full circle
from the Reagan era twenty years ago. 35
"Deregulation" was a byword of the Reagan Administration.36
Conservative ideologues within the government firmly believed in
the principles of New Federalism. 37 This meant getting the federal
government out of the business of regulating Americans' lives, and
American business in particular, and leaving the business of regu-
lation up to the individual states, to act, as described by Justice
Brandeis, as laboratories of democracy. 3S Each state was free to
experiment with differing manners and methods of governance, with-
out interference from the federal bureaucracy.
39
So it went. The architect of President Reagan's transition team
at the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), James Miller, was
dedicated to dismantling the federal system as rapidly as possible.40
Miller was subsequently appointed chairman of the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC) in 1981. As a result, the FTC under Chairman
Miller was the antithesis of activist, fulfilling the role of deregulation
34. See e.g., EditorandPublisher.com, Colbert Lampoons Bush at White
House Correspondents Dinner: President Not Amused? (Apr. 29, 2006),
http://www.editorandpublisher.com/eandp/news/article-display.jsp?vnu-content-id=10
02425363. "He prayeth best, who loveth best /All things both great and small;
/For the dear God who loveth us, /He made and loveth all." SAMUEL TAYLOR
COLERIDGE, RIME OF THE ANCIENT MARINER pt. VII (1965).
35. See Bill Keller, The Radical Presidency of George W. Bush; Reagan's
Son, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 26, 2003, (Magazine) at 26, 31 (stating that the Federal
Communications Commission and the Securities and Exchange Commission
have been as "antiregulation" as during Reagan's era and that Bush is willing
to brandish executive powers to accomplish deregulatory missions).
36. See Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,685, 41,686 (Oct. 30,
1987) (ordering Executive departments and agencies to refrain from
establishing uniform, national standards for programs).
37. See generally C. Boyden Gray, Regulation and Federalism, 1 YALE J.
ON REG. 93 (1983-1984) (describing the principles of "New Federalism" in the
context of deregulation).
38. New State Ice Co. v. Liebmann, 285 U.S. 262, 311 (1931) (Brandeis, J.,
dissenting).
39. Exec. Order No. 12,612, 52 Fed. Reg. 41,686, 41,686 ("requiring exec-
utive agencies to "[e]ncourage States to develop their own policies ... [and]
defer[ing] to the States to establish standards").
40. Susan F. Rasky, Seeking a Narrower Mandate: James Clifford Miller
3d, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 1984, at 33, 33 ("In general, Chairman Miller is an
example of heavy-handed deregulation.").
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with enforcement marked more by avoidance than by obseance.4'
Cynics, unhappy with the prevailing winds at the White House
during the eighties, saw this shift from enforcement less as a true
ideological shift than as an intellectually-supportable favoritism
towards corporate America.42 The deflated FTC took its place
alongside other -agencies, such as the Environmental Protection
Agency and the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, all of
whose enforcement activities slowed to a standstill or went careening
into reverse.43
Whatever the Administration's true motivation most of the
marketing community had an unhesitating and unequivocal reaction.
They used federal deregulation as a "Get Out of Jail Free" card and
as an uncategorical imperative to go forth and profit from deception
at the expense of unprotected consumers.
The burgeoning growth of unfounded and illegal claims for
foods' health and nutritional benefits was a prime example of the
results of deregulation fever.44 As with many floods, this began with
a chink in the dam. The Kellogg Company developed an understated
and mild campaign promoting the use of one of its cereals as part of
a diet to help prevent some forms of colon cancer.45 Even though the
National Cancer Institute carefully developed and reviewed this
campaign prior to its publication,46 the campaign was thoroughly
41. See Report of the American Bar Association Section of Antitrust Law
Special Committee to Study the Role of the Federal Trade Commission, 58
ANTITRUST L.J. 43, 54 (1989) [hereinafter ABA Special Committee] ("[T]he
public has not always received the message that the FTC believes it is
important to move aggressively against deceptive advertising .... ).
42. See generally Marian Burros, Eating Well, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 27, 1991,
at C3 (explaining that the deregulation of the Reagan administration allowed
companies, such as Kellogg, to use health claims in advertising products).
43. See Steve Nelson, Reagan Enforcement Report: Early Figures Show
Decline, LEGAL TIMES, Apr. 19, 1982, at 1 (explaining how the EPA referred
252 cases to the Justice Department in 1980 and only 79 cases in 1981).
44. See Burros, supra note 42. See generally U.S. COMM. ON GOV'T
OPERATIONS, H.R. REP. No. 100-561, DISEASE-SPECIFIC HEALTH CLAIMS ON
FOOD LABELS: AN UNHEALTHY IDEA 2-3 (1988) (providing an excellent
summary of the activities and inactivities of the various federal players during
this period, issued under the chairmanship of the late Congressman Ted Weiss
of New York).
45. Contra H.R. REP. No. 100-561, at 3 (1988) (calling Kellogg's campaign
"explicit").
46. Bruce A. Silverglade, A Comment on Public Policy Issues in Health
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illegal. 47  'The Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act, as it existed at the
time, strictly prohibited promoting a food for prevention of disease
without the Secretary of Health and Human Services' approval.48
This is precisely what Kellogg did, with the National Cancer Institute
as, perhaps, its unwitting accomplice. The Food and Drug
Administration (FDA)49 took exception and began enforcement steps
that would have stopped Kellogg's claims.
50
The FDA never had the opportunity to finish its job. Instead, the
deregulation mavens stepped in. Officials at the OMB effectively
muzzled the FDA and prevented it from enforcing the law.5 For
instance, the FDA created a policy statement in May 1986 to combat
the use of health claims on food labeling, but the OMB refused to
discuss the policy statement until March 1987 because of the OMB's
dissatisfaction with the statement as "excessively restrictive.
'" 52
Once Pandora's cereal box had been opened a crack,
pandemonium ensued. Companies of every ilk and repute began
making a variety of disease-based claims, all without the scientific
support Kellogg had amassed. 53 Nor did these companies have the
cooperation and oversight of the National Cancer Institute or any
other regulatory or nonprofit body that did not have a financial stake
Claims for Foods, 10 J. PUB. POL'Y & MARKETING 54, 55 (1991) (arguing that
Kellogg's careful adherence to many criteria advanced by health professionals,
consumer advocates and regulatory officials made its advertising campaign
both informative and effective, although unfortunately unique in this regard).
47. See H.R. REP. No. 100-561, at 2-3; see also Bruce A. Silverglade,
Preemption-The Consumer Viewpoint, 45 FOOD DRUG COSMETIC L.J. 143,
146 (1990) (describing how the Kellogg's campaign disregarded the FDA's
traditional prohibition on disease-prevention claims for foods and thereby
changed the entire enforcement arena).
48. See 21 U.S.C. § 321(g)(1)(B) (2004) (classifying a food used for the
prevention of disease in man as a "new drug"); § 355(a) (declaring that "no
person shall introduce or deliver for introduction into interstate commerce any
new drug" unless approved by the Secretary of Health and Human Services).
49. As readers may remember, the FDA are those wonderful folks who
gave you Vioxx.
50. H.R. REP. No. 100-56 1, at 3.
51. Id. at 22-26.
52. Id.
53. See, e.g., Alan S. Levy & Raymond C. Stokes, Effects of a Health
Promotion Advertising Campaign on Sales of Ready-to-Eat Cereals, 102 PUB.
HEALTH REP. 398, 402 (1987) (discussing the increase in sales of high fiber
cereals as a result of the "heavy advertising and promotional campaigns" by
Kellogg and their competitors).
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in the claims' truthfulness and legality.54
The synchronous apex and nadir of these claims was probably
oat bran beer. The very idea of promoting beer to the public as a
way to fight cholesterol without having to do more than pull a ring-
tab caused even some marketers to stop short.55  And consumer
advocates stopped a lot shorter still.
The result of this free-for-all market was a call by consumer
advocates and marketers alike for renewed federal activity.
56
Unfortunately, this call fell on plugged ears as there continued to be
an enforcement vacuum at the federal level.
57
Among the other forces of nature that abhor a vacuum are the
state attorneys general. Before the eighties, the attorneys general
focused their consumer protection efforts on problems in their own
states, leaving most national consumer protection enforcement to
their federal counterparts at the FDA and FTC.5' But with the advent
of deregulation at the federal level came a rise in activity at the state
level. The attorneys general had already come together to deal with
deception in automotive repair,59 discount airline advertising, 60 and
54. See, e.g., Charles S. Fuchs et al., Dietary Fiber and the Risk of
Colorectal Cancer and Adenoma in Women, 340 NEW ENG. J. MED. 169, 172
(1990) (illustrating why leaving it up to food marketers to cure disease is a bad
idea because this study found no evidence that dietary fiber reduces the risk of
colorectal cancer).
55. Michele Fairchild & Virginia Utermohlen, Adopting a Healthful Diet,
in YALE UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF MEDICINE HEART BOOK 53 (Genell J. Subak-
Sharpe et al. eds., 1992) ("In the late 1980s, oat bran replaced fish oil as a
painless way to lower serum cholesterol;... [w]ithin months, supermarket
shelves were stocked with everything from oat bran beer to oat bran potato
chips.").
56. Jeanne E. Saddler, FTC, Under Industry Pressure, Shows New Life in
Backing Deceptive-Ad Laws, WALL ST. J., Apr. 17, 1989, at B4.
57. During this period, the author was an assistant attorney general and
frequently observed publicly that the problem was that the FDA and FTC were,
in this author's opinion, understaffed, underfunded and under Reagan.
58. Brooke A. Masters, States Flex Prosecutorial Muscle, WASH. POST,
Jan. 12, 2005 at Al ("In the 1970s, federal officials... gave grants to states to
beef up consumer and investor protections... [thus] states began cooperating
and finding new targets.").
59. See Kathryn Casey et al., Big Suits: Texas v. AAMCO, TEX. LAW.,
Mar. 2 1987, at 12, 12 (discussing a settlement between attorneys general of
fourteen states and AAMCO Transmission, Inc.).
60. Report and Recommendations of NAAG Task Force on Air Travel
Industry: Guidelines for Air Travel Advertising, [July-Dec.] 53 Antitrust &
300
LITIGATION AS A TOOL
rental car practices,6 1 among other things. As they worked together,
they learned that they could have a significant impact on the
practices of major national companies that deceived the citizens of
their states. Even if the federal agencies charged with consumer
protection were out of commission, the state attorneys general were
willing to pool their resources to protect their own citizens.
62
During the Reagan era, several state attorneys general banded
together to bring enforcement actions against a number of food
marketers, including the makers of Campbell's soups, Sara Lee
pastries, and Nabisco's 100% Bran Cereal, for a variety of health-
related but deceptive food claims.
63
Several states fulfilled the New Federalism's promise by
enforcing their own consumer protection laws. 64 The food industry
began to object to this enforcement, despite having reacted so
positively when new federalism equated with no law enforcement at
the federal level.65  The food industry began to level claims of
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1345, at S-3 (Supp. Dec. 17, 1987). But see
Morales v. Trans World Airlines, Inc., 504 U.S. 374, 391 (1992)..
61. Final Report and Recommendations of the National Association of
Attorneys General Task Force on Car Rental Industry Advertising and
Practices, [Jan.-June] 56 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 1407, at S-
3, (Supp. Mar. 16, 1989).
62. ABA Special Committee, supra note 41, at 71-72.
63. Burros, supra note 42; Carole Sugarman, The New Chow Hounds:
States Join Forces to Monitor Product Claims, WASH. POST, Sept. 21, 1998, at
El.
64. Sugarman, supra note 63.
65. Probably the finest example of these arguments can be found in JOHN E.
CALFEE & JANIS K. PAPPALARDO, BUREAU OF ECON., FTC, How SHOULD
HEALTH CLAIMS FOR FOODS BE REGULATED? AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE
(1989), which serves as a paradigm of the FTC carrying the industry's water.
As an artifact of a failed regulatory approach, this piece is a must read. One
way for those who opposed consumer protection efforts in the 1980s to
advance an intellectual justification for their inactivity was to use a cost-benefit
analysis. See Joan Claybrook & David Bollier, The Hidden Benefits of
Regulation: Disclosing the Auto Safety Payoff, 3 YALE J. ON REG. 87, 125027
(1985). As for this breed of economists, they found any inconvenience to
industry a major cost and found no benefit to a deception-free marketplace.
See id. at 128-29 (explaining that cost-benefit analysis eliminates necessary
ethical, moral, and political considerations in the regulatory process by
favoring an abstract economical model that overemphasizes costs of
compliance). Thus, the cost-benefit battles were over before they began.
Calfee and Pappalardo's attempt to quantify that which is essentially
metaphysical reached its charmingly nutty peak when they put forth the
May 2006]
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preemption, commerce clause problems, and First Amendment
infringement against states that chose to act against deceptive food
marketers' claims for foods. 66 All the claims proved fruitless. 67 The
state attorneys general did not go away. 68  The rise in states'
activities caused marketers to renew their demands that the FDA,
FTC and other federal agencies take action.
69
The Chicago-school economic theories that fueled the
deregulation fever on the Potomac in the eighties had been running
on empty for some time. 70 In its simplest form, the Chicago-school
hypothesis, as applied to marketing practices, was that information is
good; the more the better.7' If the information contains falsehoods,
that is bearable, because the marketplace will step in to correct the
falsehoods. 72 This argument was flawed. In fact, the marketplace
adjusted to deceptive claims; unfortunately, it adjusted down-
proposition that the best justification for the FDA failing to act on illegal health
claims was derived from the formula: EV = PtBt - (l-Pt)Cf, where EV is the
expected value of allowing a health claim, Pt is the probability that the claim
will turn out to be true, Bt is the estimated net benefit of allowing the claim if
it turns out to be true, and Cf is the estimated net cost of allowing the claim if it
turns out to be false. Id. at 39-44.
66. See generally Richard L. Cleland, The Regulation of Food Labeling: An
Effective, Uniform National Standard Without More Preemption, in
AMERICA'S FOODS HEALTH MESSAGES AND CLAIMS: SCIENTIFIC,
REGULATORY, AND LEGAL ISSUES 91 (James E. Tillotson ed., 1993)
(discussing how national uniformity of food labeling standards, to the extent
that it is needed to protect consumer and food industry interests, should be
based on a composite of state and federal regulations); Charles P. Mitchell,
State Regulation and Federal Preemption of Food Labeling, 45 FOOD DRUG
COSMETIC L.J. 123 (1990) (discussing of the evils of preemption and the lack
of legal underpinnings for it);.
67. See, e.g., Kellogg Co. v. Mattox, 763 F. Supp. 1369 (N.D. Tex. 1991),
affid, 940 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir. 1991) (denying vehemently Kellogg's motion
against the Texas Attorney General, Jim Mattox, for a preliminary injunction
for the right to violate state food labeling laws on several constitutional
grounds, including the Commerce Clause and the First Amendment).
68. Burros, supra note 42 (stating that Attorneys General continue to do
most of the litigating against food companies for their deceptive marketing
practices).
69. FTC's Welcome Return, ADVERTISING AGE, Feb. 6, 1989, at 16;
Saddler, supra note 56.
70. See A Critique of the Chicago School of Economics, http://www
.huppi.com/kangaroo/L-chiintro.htm (last visited Nov. 4, 2005) (discussing the
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honest marketers sank to the level of their dishonest competitors just
to be able to compete.73
Belatedly following on the heels of the state attorneys general,
FDA and FTC activity increased in the late eighties and through the
nineties. FDA Commissioner David Kessler was an outstanding
example of leadership at the top of the administration.
Then came the 2000 election. As a candidate, George W. Bush
portrayed himself as an ardent Federalist and opponent of federal
control over state activities. 74 He apparently overcame his professed
opposition to federal control of state activities long enough to get
himself made President, by seeking federal interference with
Florida's electoral process.75 As President, Bush continued to retreat
from Federalism when it served his purposes.
76
Federal enforcement has in fact fallen below the prior nadir in
the Reagan era, which is no mean feat. Unlike the Reagan
deregulators, however, the Bush administration is not following an
ideology of decreased federal activity. Instead, the current effect of
much federal regulation has been to try to accommodate big compa-
nies.77 The FDA, in particular, has sinned most grievously. It has
abandoned its long-time deference to state health officials and state
food and drug enforcement in favor of an active program of
intervention by its General Counsel office in private and public suits
alike, urging that those suits are preempted by federal regulation (or
78the lack thereof). Even the Institute of Medicine of the National
Academies proposed to turn federal regulatory efforts over to
industry, donning blinders to conclude that "[t]here is not enough
evidence of food, beverage, and entertainment advertising's adverse
impacts on children to support calling for a ban on all such
73. See Burros, supra note 42 (discussing the proliferation of lawsuits
against food companies due to the deregulation of the Regan era).
74. See Bruce Fein, Bogus Federalism, WASH. TIMES, June 2, 2004, at A15.
75. See Bush v. Gore, 531 U.S. 98 (2000).
76. See Fein, supra note 74 ("President Bush honors federalism more in the
breach than in the observance, contrary to his vocal celebration of states' rights
as a candidate in the 2000 campaign.").
77. See supra note 57. In this author's opinion, the correlative term to the
1980s "understaffed, underfunded, and under Reagan" would be that federal
agencies are now "Bushwhacked."
78. E.g., Robert Cohen, FDA Stepping into Liability Lawsuits on Side of
Drug Makers it Regulates, SEATTLE TIMES, May 11, 2004, at A2.
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advertising to kids." 79 Instead of governmental action, the Institute
of Medicine favored allowing food marketers to police themselves:
"Industry should develop and strictly adhere to marketing and adver-
tising guidelines that minimize the risk of obesity in children and
youth. '80  I
It is in this atmosphere of federal complicity and the deception
by food marketers and others that we now find ourselves confronting
the childhood obesity epidemic.
IV. CSPI's RESPONSE To FEDERAL SLACKING
Although other advocacy groups and private lawyers have also
responded to federal inactivity, a brief history of CSPI's entry into
private litigation is instructive.
For decades, CSPI both publicly criticized food companies for
their deceptive marketing practices and sought to convince them to
produce more healthful foods.8' While these efforts sometimes suc-
ceeded, the companies would often ignore CSPI's entreaties.12 CSPI
would then turn to the FTC, the FDA, or some other public
enforcement agency to achieve sometimes mixed, but often positive,
results
8 3
In the new millennium, however, the federal regulators went to
ground,84 emerging from their holes only to file an amicus brief or
two that urged courts to ignore state law and pay attention solely to
i
79. INST. OF MED., FACT SHEET: ADVERTISING, MARKETING AND THE
MEDIA: IMPROVING MESSAGES (2004), available at www.iom.edu/includes
/DBFile.asp?id=22609.
80. COMM. ON PREVENTION OF OBESITY IN CHILDREN & YOUTH, INST. OF
MED., PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HEALTH IN THE BALANCE 177
(Jeffrey P. Koplan et al. eds., 2005); see also INST. OF MED., REPORT BRIEF:
PREVENTING CHILDHOOD OBESITY: HEALTH IN THE BALANCE, (2000)
available at http://www.iom.edu/Object.File/Master/25/858/0.pdf (summa-
rizing the above report).
81. See Malmgren, supra note 15 (outlining CSPI's entreaties to the FDA to
stop food companie§' deceptive marketing practices).
82. See id.
83. Id.
84. See Masters, supra note 58 ("Americans once relied primarily on an
alphabet soup of federal agencies-SEC, FTC, EPA-to protect investors,
consumers and the environment. But state regulators and attorneys general are
bringing legal action and launching investigations in these and other areas
where they say federal regulators have fallen down on the job.").
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the federal government's refusal to enforce the law.
85
CSPI turned: to the courts to stop deceptive labeling, fraudulent
advertising and the use of dangerous food additives.8 6 To do so, it
created its Litigation Project in 2004.7 Within its first year, CSPI
settled claims of deceptive labeling against Tropicana for its Peach
Papaya, Aunt Jemima for its Frozen Blueberry Waffles, Quaker for
its Fruit and Cream Instant Oatmeal and other food companies. 88 In
several instances, CSPI was able to resolve the problem through
informal negotiations with the company. When those efforts failed
CSPI's Litigation Project became involved in private lawsuits on
behalf of consumers.
For example, CSPI joined a pending case against Arizona Rx
beverages for introducing a new line of drinks that claimed to have
near-miraculous health effects achieved by using gingko biloba,
panax ginseng, Echinacea and other substances.8 9 The amounts of
these ingredients in the beverages were miniscule, sometimes un-
detectable, and it was unclear if any dose of the herbs would deliver
the promised benefits.
90
CSPI's Litigation Project also helped an injured consumer bring
an action against Whole Foods Company and Quorn Foods for the
manufacturing and sale of a meat substitute.9 1  Quorn Foods
acknowledged that this product caused "allergic and adverse
reactions. ' 9 2 However, both Quorn Foods and Whole Foods rejected
CSPI's and consumers' requests to put a simple warning on the label
(like those required for peanuts, milk or wheat allergies) so that
consumers would know of the possible reaction. 9' CSPI had already
85. See supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text.
86. Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Interest, Food Watchdog Group
Announces Litigation Initiative (May 3, 2005), available at http://www.cspinet
.org/new/200505031 .html.
87. Id.
88. Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Interest, Crackdown on Fraudulent
Food Labels Urged (Oct. 27, 2005), available at http://www.cspinet.org/
new/200510272.html.
89. Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Interest, supra note 86.
90. See id.; Press Release, Ctr. for Sci. in Pub. Interest, Arizona Rx Teas:
Prescription for Lawsuits (Apr. 29, 2003), available at http://www.cspinet
.org/new/200304291 .html.
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asked the FDA to ban the proprietary soil fungus that serves as the
primary ingredient of Quorn products, or at least to require a
warning, but the FDA went along with the company, leaving the
consumer no option but to file his own lawsuit.
94
Thus, the private approach often worked, but when it did not,
CSPI was willing to extend its own activity into the courts, to help
consumers try to stop deception.
V. THE PROMISED COUNTERPOINT
As promised, this Article serves as a counterpoint to Litigation
as a Tool in Food Advertising: Consumer Protection Statutes.9' That
piece successfully (though far from impartially) describes some of
the problems with, and the limited case law in the area of, food
marketing. The article weakens, though, in Part II, which purports to
show why litigation is just a bad idea (ironic given that both the
authors are lawyers).96 As Bond and Price's article focuses its
critical review on marketing to children, this Article will as well, by
comparing each perceived cost to its corresponding reality.
PERCEPTION: "Litigation is always uncertain." 7
REALITY: Life is also uncertain, but we do not give up on it.
What is certain is that litigation, or even the threat of it, can succeed
where all else has failed. CSPI's own recent experience with its
Litigation Project has shown that.
PERCEPTION: "Litigation is narrow and often case-specific."
98
REALITY: Although judges do tend to insist that a lawsuit
involve specific facts and specific violations of specific laws, impact
litigation, such as actions against junk-food companies for marketing
to kids, can often have an influence far beyond the case at hand. For
example, the Pelman lawsuit, discussed by the Bond and Price
article, has absolutely raised the bar in the debate about the link
between junk food and childhood obesity, taking the discussion far
beyond the two plaintiffs and one lawyer involved. 99
94. Id.
95. Price & Bond, supra note 1.
96. Id. 1
97. Id. at 285.
98. Id.
99. Pelman v. McDonald's Corp., 396 F.3d 508 (2d Cir. 2005); Price &
Bond, supra note 1, at 282-83.
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PERCEPTION: "Counsel are inevitably influenced by the
availability of attorneys fees."'
100
REALITY: Pot, meet kettle. Contrary to reports spread by busi-
ness interests, the possibility of fees is not the only motivator in
public interest litigation. In fact, its perforce comes in second to
stopping illegal practices and forcing deceptive defendants to yield at
least some of the fruits of their deception because monetary or
injunctive relief is a prerequisite to an award of fees. Moreover, the
Price and Bond article acknowledges this possibility by quoting one
of the leading lawyers in this field as saying he does not "profit from
these suits. . . ."101 Of course, private lawyers must get paid, but-in
case no one has noticed-the courts are not overflowing with food
marketing lawsuits. In fact, the Price and Bond article only came up
with three lawsuits to support its seven bullets of possible allegations
by plaintiffs. 0 2  It appears that there have, in fact, been more
seminars sponsored bT defense lawyers to talk about these lawsuits
than actual lawsuits.'
0
PERCEPTION: "Litigation can be expensive and time-
consuming." 04
REALITY: Pot, meet kettle, part II. Although efficient litigation
need not be expensive, defense counsel consume cost and time by
filing multiple motions to prevent the merits of lawsuits from ever
coming before a jury.10 5  Defense counsel use these dilatory and
obstructionist tactics during the lawsuit's discovery phase to keep the
truth from the plaintiff. 106
PERCEPTION: "Litigation is not always a quick fix."'0 7
REALITY: In this area, there is not a quick fix, as proven by the
years of complacency of food marketers and federal agencies alike.
Although some lawsuits drag on for years, usually because of
100. Price & Bond, supra note 1, at 285.
101. Id. at 286 n.66.
102. See id.
103. Evan Schaeffer's Legal Underground, http://www.legalunderground
.com (Apr. 19, 2005).
104. Price & Bond, supra note 1, at 286.
105. See Symposium, Selected Tort and Civil Justice Issues Before the 117th
Ohio GeneralAssembly, 48 Oio ST. L.J. 365, 373 (1987).
106. See id.
107. Price & Bond, supra note 1, at 287.
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defense tactics, 10 others result in true gains in a short time. For
example, the Tropicana Peach Papaya lawsuit, brought by private
counsel and CSPI's Litigation Project, took a little over six months to
settle. 10 9 In addition, advocates are not looking for a "quick fix" but
rather an effective, long-term cure.
PERCEPTION: "Litigation may not expedite broad public
benefits.""10
REALITY: This claim essentially depends on who determines
public benefits-advocacy groups and lawyers who work for free
unless they win, or multinational companies and their lawyers who
get paid by the month.
PERCEPTION: "The legislative and executive branches are better
equipped.""'
REALITY: Correct. That is why CSPI went to legislatures and
agencies for decades before giving up and starting its Litigation
Project. The other two branches of government have fallen asleep at
the wheel, 1 2 leaving the courts as the only option in some cases.
PERCEPTION: "[S]ociety . .. [can] address the issues raised by
food advertising to children."" 3
REALITY: One of the Price and Bond article's icons of "society"
is the Children's Advertising Review Unit (CARU)," 4 a trade group
that is so weak aqd so ineffective that its parent, the National Adver-
tising Review Council, announced plans in the summer of 2005 to
consider changes in CARU's policies." 5 In the fall of 2005, CARU
108. Symposium, supra note 105, at 373.
109. See Stipulation and Agreement of Compromise and Settlement, Gray v.
Tropicana Corp., No. CAM-L-1393-05 (N.J. Super. Ct. Aug. 11, 2005),
available at http://www.cspinet.org/new/pdf/tropicanaagreement.pdf (stating
that plaintiffs filed the case on February 24, 2005 and dating the stipulation to
settle on August 11, 2005).
110. Price & Bond, supra note 1, at 287.
111. Id. at288.
112. See supra Part II.
113. Id. at289.
114. See About the Children's Advertising Review Unit (CARU),
http://www.caru.org/about/index.asp (last visited Mar. 14, 2006) (noting that
CARU is the children's arm of the advertising industry's self-regulation
program and was founded in 1974 as part of a strategic alliance with the major
advertising trade associations through the National Advertising Review
Council).
115. C. Manly Molpus, President & CEO, Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n, Remarks at
the Perspectives on Marketing, Self-Regulation and Childhood Obesity
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sent a letter to the Federal Trade Commission outlining minor
procedural changes. 116 Whether CARU actually makes significant
changes is less than certain. Its process is heavily dominated by
those whom it purports to control. For example, marketers or their
advertising agencies comprise eighteen of the twenty-two positions
on CARU's advisory board. 1 7 Perhaps this is why its process is
glacial. As former Director of Commercial Clearances for MTV
Networks, Lisa Slythe, said, "By the time they take action, the
commercial has usual [sic] finished running as scheduled and been
viewed by millions of children.""18  CARU is not only a slow-
moving creature of industry, it has no enforcement powers."19 Thus,
it is less a watchdog than a chicken guarding the foxhole.
VI. CONCLUSION
Kids are getting fatter because of the foods that food marketers
sell directly to children. With obesity come severe health risks, as
well as social opprobrium.
Lawsuits are not the best way to resolve a dispute, but
sometimes they are the only way. Private litigation is on the rise
only because there is a near-complete failure of federal consumer
protection. Congress does not even consider consumer protection
laws, and the industry, as a result, has run rampant.
There is a simple step that food marketers can take to prevent
litigation-stop deceptive and unfair marketing practices aimed to
get kids to eat even more junk food.
Workshop 128-30 (July 15, 2005) (transcript available at http://www.ftc.gov/
bcp/workshops/foodmarketingtokids/transcript_050715.pdf).
116. Letter from James R. Guthrie, President & CEO, Nat'l Adver. Review
Council, to Donald S. Clark, FTC, and C. Manly Molpus, President & CEO,
Grocery Mfrs. Ass'n (Sept. 15, 2005), available at http://www.ftc.gov/os/
comments/FoodMarketingtoKids/516960-00072.pdf. Most of the Jletter
consists of either reiteration of current CARU policy or announcement of an
intent to think more about future changes. Id. The sole concrete change was
the decision to put a complaint form on its Web site-by no means a radical
revision or improvement. Id. at 2.
117. Lisa Flythe, Problems with Self-Regulation, Commercial-Free
Childhood, http://www.commercialfreechildhood.org/articles/3rdsummit/flythe
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